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to this book. Given the representation herein of Irish nationalism, including Irish-America, I must
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The Belfast Agreement (or "Agreement"), to give it its
proper name,1 reached at Stormont on Good Friday 1998, is an
important document of Irish history. 'It is certainly a political
text, but it has important legal effects. And these I wish to em-
phasize. As a member of the Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP")-
elected later to the Northern Ireland Assembly-I accepted the
Agreement on April 10 as the best opportunity for the return of
power to all the people of Northern Ireland. At the time of writ-
ing (early March 1999), the major issue remains the decommis-
sioning of Irish Republican Army ("IRA") arms before-I sub-
mit-Sinn Fin is entitled to its two seats on the Northern Ire-
land executive.
Selected aspects of the Agreement are discussed in other
contributions to this book. Given the representation herein of
Irish nationalism, including Irish-America, I must begin by defin-
ing-against the condescension of some observers of Ireland-
the plain people of Ulster as important historical actors.
I. ULSTER UNIONISM
Ulster unionists-contrary to those who believe in an Irish
nation-affirm the 1800 acts of union, whereby Ireland and
Great Britain merged to form the United Kingdom. (The two
hundredth anniversary of the union, which will be celebrated
hopefully throughout Ireland, is January 1, 2001-the vacated
start of the millenium). Scholars in Ireland are producing a
more balanced history of the union, which witnessed famine and
violence, but also industrialization and democracy. Ulster
unionism, a pan-class alliance, dates from the 1880s, when Irish
• Ulster Unionist Party; Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I am grateful
to fellow Assembly member, Esmond Birnie, and to Graham Gudgin, special advisor to
the First Minister, the Rt. Hon. David Trimble MP, for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, Cm. 3883
(presented to parliament on Apr. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Belfast Agreement]. This is
the same thirty-page text that was sent to the people of Northern Ireland immediately
after its conclusion. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 also refers to the Belfast Agree-
ment. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47 (Eng.).
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nationalism, in association with some British liberals, pressed for
home rule for the whole of Ireland.
Unionists opposed nineteenth-century secession as bad for
Ireland, Ulster included. But they, unlike their opponents, did
not rest their case exclusively on imputed identity or nationality.
The union was the constitutional status quo, and the Westminster
parliament was the place for legislative reform. The-divided-
will of the people led eventually to partition, a British solution to
an Irish problem. This was a vindication of-British and Irish-
democracy.
Sir James Craig, soon to be Northern Ireland's first prime
minister, accepted the 1920 Government of Ireland Act
("GOIA"). He was not much concerned with the rest of Ireland,
and subsequently left the U.K. government and the then Sinn
Frin to agree on a new dominion state for twenty-six counties-
the Irish Free State, later tire (or Ireland), and now the in-
dependent Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland, consisting of
the remaining six counties, or "Ulster" as unionists called the
region, remained part of the United Kingdom, but with its own
subordinate parliament and government. The unionists ac-
cepted devolution, designed ironically to appease Irish national-
ists, in order to preserve the link with Great Britain. Sir James
never characterized Northern Ireland as having a Protestant par-
liament for a Protestant people in the 1930s, as alleged by Irish
nationalists,2 but the Rt. Hon. David Trimble MP, my party
leader, acknowledged in his Nobel lecture in Oslo in December
1998 that it was a "cold house" for the Catholic minority.
The rest is history, albeit of a contemporary kind. Histori-
ans are unearthing the Stormont regime of 1921-1972, and
scholarship-not the streets-should be the arena of contesta-
tion. But one political conclusion is surely incontestable:
whatever civil rights were denied (and this was remedied by 1973
at the latest), nothing justified the military campaign of the IRA
between 1970 andJuly 1997 (when it resumed the "complete ces-
sation of military operations" that it had broken with the
London docklands bomb in February 1996).
2. JJ. Campbell, Between the Wars, in BELFAST: THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF AN
INDUSTRIAL CITY 152 (J.C. Beckett & R.E. Glasscock eds., 1967). The misquotation-an
inaccurate paraphrasing of Campbell's words selected out of context-was popularized
during the civil rights movement.
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April 10, 1998 was virtually the thirtieth anniversary of the
outbreak of the Northern Ireland Troubles. The Belfast Agree-
ment is the most recent in a series of proposed solutions, starting
with the Sunningdale experiment of 1974. Mainly, unionists had
opposed that experiment. Nationalists scuppered subsequent at-
tempts to create political stability. The 1998 solution-from the
perspective of March 1999-still looks the most viable for three
major reasons: one, the sheer length of the hurting stalemate in
Northern Ireland; two (though I have my criticisms), the inclu-
sive nature of the negotiations hosted by the U.K. government,
at the behest of the Irish government, in 1996-1998; and three,
the determination of London and Dublin, particularly Tony
Blair and Bertie Ahern, to remove the problem from their polit-
ical agendas.
II. THE NEGOTIATIONS
The negotiations can be traced from approximately 1988,
over almost a ten-year period.' Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, Peter Brooke (1989-1992), began the process. Sir Pat-
rick Mayhew (1992-1997) continued it. (The role of Mo
Mowlam, who was formally in charge at Castle Buildings4 on
Good Friday, has been exaggerated by British commentators.)
While some progress was made in talks in 1990-1992, there re-
mained a nationalist refusal to reach a historic compromise with
unionism.
At that stage, Sinn Fain, as the political wing of the IRA, was
excluded. London, encouraged actively by Dublin, then made
an offer: give up violence, and you can be part of the solution.
Unfortunately, the republicans took without reciprocating, and
the British and Irish governments compromised democratic in-
stitutions by making concession after concession to fully-armed
terrorists. The Mitchell report of January 1996, little
remembered, had envisaged decommissioning (that is, the sur-
rendering Of illegally-held arms and explosives) during all-party
talks.5 The IRA did not decommission during the talks, even af-
3. EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID MCK1TTRICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET STORY
BEHIND THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS (1997).
4. The venue for the talks, on the Stormont Estate outside Belfast.
5. THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY 11-12 (Jan. 22,
1996).
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ter Sinn Fin was admitted as a full participant in September
1997, and nine months after the Belfast Agreement, the IRA has
yet to begin handing in weapons.
The Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 and the
Framework Documents of February 1995, agreed upon by the
two governments (but drafted mainly in Dublin), are considered
gestatory of the final Agreement. They were considerably less
relevant than the Heads of Agreement of January 12, 1998,
which turned out to be the framework for the Belfast Agreement
three months later. Without Tony Blair, and to a considerably
lesser extent, Bertie Ahern, there would have been no agree-
ment. Indeed, it is widely believed that the letter from the Brit-
ish prime minister to David Trimble on that Friday afternoon
(see further below) was necessary to unblock final unionist resist-
ance to Senator Mitchell's draft paper. I can confirm that this is
a correct interpretation.
III. THE BELFAST A GREEMENT
It is always naive to associate a historic document with an
outbreak of spontaneous reconciliation. Perhaps agreements
come about through changes in consciousness. But more often
they resemble the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war in
Bosnia. The negotiation of the Belfast Agreement was never
quite that painful (despite Irish attempts to coax participants to
one isolated spot after another), but it was an imposed political
settlement. Senator Mitchell, the independent chairman who
had been appointed by the London and Dublin governments,
has iron teeth behind his American smile. And his draft paper
of April 6, 1998, which the deputy leader of the UUP, John Tay-
lor, refused to touch with his forty-foot pole, was designed to
force an outcome.
A. Legitimization
The process of legitimization-selling the Agreement-
came after the parties assented to the Good Friday text. (Sinn
Fain should be excluded from this description; the party re-
served its position, and ministers have been unclear as to
whether it signed up to the agreement) .6 There were two demo-
6. Gerry Adams MP told the final plenary: "When we have democratically come to
a conclusion we will let you know." IRISH TIMES, Apr. 11, 1998.
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cratic opportunities: the May 22 referendum and the Northern
Ireland Assembly elections on June 25, 1998, both of which pro-
duced results in favor of the Agreement.
In the May 22 referendum, with an 81.1% voter turnout in
Northern Ireland, 676,966 voters comprising 71.12% voted "yes"
to the Agreement, whereas 274,879 voters compromising 28.88%
voted "no." The U.K. Government hailed the result as a 71%
"yes." Unfortunately, as was to be seen in the Assembly elections,
most of the "no"s came from the unionist majority. To many
Unionists, the pro-nationalist nature of the Agreement was rein-
forced by a second referendum on May 22, in the Republic of
Ireland. The simultaneous referendums, albeit on different
questions, was an aspect of reinforcing the nationalist worldview;
republicans saw it as a plebiscite of the Irish people. With a
56.3% turnout in the Republic, 1,442,583 voters comprising
94.39% voted "yes," whereas 85,748 comprising 5.61% voted
"no." This 94% figure resembled the suspect democratic accla-
mations often found in third world nations! Contrary to the
view of some Dublin commentators, there is no constitutional
basis for combining the northern and southern figures because
there are two states in Ireland. The view of so-called revisionists
in the Republic, that the national question mattered little, was
vindicated fully by this referendum result. "Yes" campaigners
had difficulty finding opponents, other than the few usual sus-
pects in the Dublin media. Because the 5.61% "no"s were
spread fairly evenly throughout the state, it was not possible to
form a nationalist community in the border counties or even the
west of Ireland.
The referendum results, I would argue, show that the Brit-
ish and Irish Governments got the balance of the Agreement
wrong. London too readily accepted Dublin's view of nationalist
preoccupation, Sinn F~in having exploited successfully the tradi-
tional political culture in its meetings with Dublin ministers and
officials. The split in the protestant majority is the biggest chal-
lenge facing not just pro-Agreement unionists, but northern na-
tionalists and their southern supporters. The southern political
class, which took few political risks, could have afforded a larger
"no" vote, ideally preserving, in aspic, some national myths about
the destiny of the Irish people. As it was, the Belfast Agreement,
which was seen to favor the northern minority, simultaneously
affirmed nationalist aspirations and revisionist values and re-
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flected the communal, consensual nature of the Irish state.7
Dublin could have done a great deal more for peace in Ire-
land by affirming liberal pluralism and purging its polity of na-
tionalist shibboleths. Had this been accomplished, my col-
leagues and I would have found it that much easier to rebut
many of the fanciful arguments of anti-Agreement unionists.
The Assembly elections five weeks later pointed up the per-
sisting protestant "no"s problem. There were 108 seats to be fil-
led, an extraordinary number for some one million voters. This
was, however, the product of a London/Dublin policy to help
minority-especially pro-paramilitary-parties!8 My party, the
UUP, secured the largest number of seats: twenty-eight. The
mainly Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"),
though it got the largest number of first preference votes, placed
second with twenty-four seats. Together, the two biggest parties
control fifty-two of the 108 seats. With potential allies, David
Trimble and John Hume can perhaps claim the support of an
additional ten, making a centrist majority of sixty-two against
forty-six on a simple vote.
Things, however, are unlikely to be that simple. The third
largest party is the Democratic Unionist Party ("DUP"), led by
Dr. Ian Paisley, and the fourth is Sinn Fain, with eighteen seats.
There are, in addition to the DUP, another eight anti-Agree-
ment unionists.' Extremes of eighteen (Sinn F6in) and twenty-
eight (the combined "no" unionists) are a threat to the centrist
parties, even if they are unlikely to combine on a matter of prin-
ciple. Commentators-seeing Sinn Fain as part of the solu-
tion-have estimated that the pro/anti-Agreement split (insofar
as relevant) in the Assembly is eighty versus twenty-eight. This
healthy British majority of 74.1% to 25.9% (almost three to one)
represents an improvement on the May 22 referendum result.
7. The Irish Government, for reasons that were not made clear, distributed copies
of the Agreement to all households in the Republic, even though electors were only
voting on a constitutional amendment. (In the simultaneous referendum on the Am-
sterdam treaty on the European Union, voters in the Republic were not sent copies of
the relevant document!).
8. Sinn Fin, which got 18 seats, did not need this help. The Progressive Unionist
Party ("PUP") got two seats, but the Ulster Democratic Party ("UDP"), led by Gary Mc-
Michael, failed to win any. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, a favorite of the
Secretary of State, surprised most commentators by winning two seats.
9. Northern Ireland Unionist Party ("NIUP"), 4; United Kingdom Unionist Party
("UKUP"), 1; United Unionist Assembly Party ("UUAP"), 3.
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But, again, the intra-sectarian balances, especially for unionists,
may prove decisive, given the phenomenon of cross-community
voting provided for in the Agreement.
Only eight members of the Assembly are registered "Other,"
under the designation of identity.' ° There are forty-two nation-
alists and fifty-eight unionists registered, which roughly reflects
the 60/40 Protestant/Catholic ethnic balance. While the SDLP-
Sinn Fin relationship remains to be tested, the fifty-eight union-
ists are already split: thirty "yes" supporters and twenty-eight
"no" supporters.
David Trimble leads twenty-eight of the "yes" unionist As-
sembly members and would hope to rely upon the two Progres-
sive Unionist Party ("PUP") members. But thirty against twenty-
eight is only a slight tribal majority. This is especially crucial
given the existence of cross-community support in the Assem-
bly.1
Thirty is not the threshold figure that some believe it to be.
In fact, a petition of concern by at least thirty Assembly members
can trigger a cross-community vote. 12 This would be achieved if
the two PUP members allied with the "no" unionists, or there
were two defectors from the UUP. 1' But a cross-community vote
can only succeed on a basis of parallel consent, a majority of
unionists plus a majority of nationalists,14 or a sixty percent
weighted majority, comprising at least forty percent of unionists
and forty percent of nationalists. "No" unionists, on a parallel
vote, would have to get at least thirty of the fifty-eight unionist
votes, involving two UUP defectors, but they would be unlikely to
get a nationalist majority on the same vote. More likely, "no"
unionists would be intent upon blocking a cross-community
10. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Operation of the Assembly 6; Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47,
§ 4(5) (Eng.); Initial Standing Orders, 3(1).
11. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Safeguards 5(d); Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, §§ 4(5),
41(2), 42(1)-(2); Initial Standing Orders, 12. "Cross community support" is essentially
the idea that key (including certain procedural) decisions can only be taken by nation-
alists and unionists present in the Assembly voting together.
12. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Safeguards 5(d); Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 42(1)-(2);
Initial Standing Orders, 12(5).
13. On January 18, 1999, a Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP") Assembly member, Peter
Weir, voted against a party position. The following day he lost the whip.
14. There is also a requirement for a majority of all members present and voting.
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vote, which makes the petition of concern irrelevant. One
defector is enough to frustrate a unionist majority. On a
weighted majority, "no" unionists would need at least sixty per-
cent of the unionist vote, that is thirty-five members, involving
seven defectors from the UUP. Under the Initial Standing Or-
ders, parallel consent is the system for the election of the first
minister and deputy first minister," but it is not clear whether a
weighted majority will be required for all other key decisions. 16
Two UUP defectors for a petition of concern may be within
the grasp of the "no" camp, but they are unlikely to achieve the
thirty-five members (involving seven such defectors) necessary to
frustrate a weighted-majority cross-community vote. Neverthe-
less, the "no" camp should not be underestimated politically,
given its readiness-to varying degrees-to oppose individual
decisions in the name of destroying the Agreement.
B. The Agreement in Outline
The Agreement runs to some thirty printed pages, and read-
ers may consult the text in this volume. It has become the prac-
tice to refer to specific paragraphs within each section listed in
the table of contents. While there are eleven sections, the Agree-
ment addresses three principal areas: one, the constitutional po-
sition of Northern Ireland; two, the institutions of government,
mainly devolution but with north/south and east/west additions;
and three, what is sometimes called rights, but is better referred
to as the transition from terrorism to democracy. I will look at
each of these three areas in turn, but first it is necessary to appre-
ciate the structure of the Agreement.
1. How to Read the Belfast Agreement
Lawyers have to insist that the Agreement is a legal text, or
at least a political document containing legal obligations. More-
over, they have to do so against some political actors and com-
mentators more accustomed, it would seem, to casuistry. Take,
for instance, the repeated attempts by Sinn Fain and its fellow
travellers to deny the need for IRA decommissioning before the
formation of a Northern Ireland executive. They infer that if
15. Initial Standing Orders, 12(3).
16. Presumably this is a matter for the Presiding Officer, under section 2(1) of the
Initial Standing Orders.
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the obligation is not express, then it cannot exist impliedly-
either morally or legally-in the Agreement.
Naming an agreement after a place suggests that legally it is
a treaty. Looking at the thirty-page text, the Agreement is de-
scribed as having been "reached in the multi-party negotiations."
In fact, the participants in the talks comprised two governments
and ten Northern Ireland political parties. There was no signing
of the multi-party Agreement by the political parties, but there
was a process of assent, either then or, maybe in the case of Sinn
Fain, later. At best, one can say that the political parties agreed
to be bound morally, but hardly legally.
The only parties-in a legal sense-were the British and
Irish Governments, which is clear from looking at the table of
contents. After the multi-party agreement, there is an annex.
This annex, on pages twenty-seven to thirty, is an international
agreement between the British and Irish Governments, else-
where called the British-Irish Agreement. 7 It is the text that
Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern signed at Castle Buildings on April
10, 1998, at the end of the final plenary of the parties, presided
over by Senator Mitchell. This treaty is short, comprising only
four articles, with two annexes. The first annex contains the
Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Talks. One needs to read
the treaty on pages twenty-seven to thirty, and then pages one to
twenty-six as the first annex. It is a strange way to present a legal
text, but one required by the exigencies of an imposed settle-
ment, which London and Dublin intended to have legitimized
immediately.
The assertion that only the two Governments are parties to
the Agreement needs slight qualification. These states' parties
undertook to discharge certain obligations, including, in the
case of the U.K. Government, legislating principally for devolu-
tion. The Northern Ireland Act of 1998,"8 which received the
royal assent on November 19, 1998, imposes statutory obliga-
tions mainly on the first minister and deputy first minister but
also on other office holders. In the transition, other acts apply
variously. The question of legal obligation needs to be answered
17. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Three, British-Irish Council 1. Para-
graph 1 of Strand Two refers inelegantly to a British-Irish Agreement. Id., Strand Two,
North/South Ministerial Council 1. Paragraph 1 of Constitutional Issues also refers
to "a new British-Irish Agreement." Id., Constitutional Issues 1 1.
18. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47 (Eng.).
THE BELFAST AGREEMENT
subtly. This raises questions over the rules of interpretation.
The Agreement is not a U.K. statute, nor is it common law. It is
a treaty, and as such, Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the law of treaties apply. The Convention states that
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of the object and purpose. " "
Terms such as "good faith," "ordinary meaning," "context," and
"purpose" prove that literalness is inappropriate. Indeed, pur-
posiveness is the correct approach. Article 31 goes on to include
the preamble and annexes in the text of a treaty and to define
context as including other instruments related to the treaty.
Also taken into account are subsequent agreements, or practice,
and any other relevant rules of international law. Supplemen-
tary means of interpretation, including preparatory work and
the circumstances of its conclusion, are permitted in certain
eventualities under Article 32. This is of general applicability to
the Agreement, and even to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, in-
sofar as it incorporates, by reference, aspects of the Belfast
Agreement. It is especially applicable to the question of decom-
missioning.
2. The Constitutional Position of Northern Ireland
The Irish Free State, which was created by U.K. law in 1921
and 1922, it is often forgotten, followed the establishment of
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The subsequent
boundary commission was frustrated as much by nationalist am-
bition as unionist abstention. Nevertheless, under a 1925 agree-
ment, the Free State recognized Northern Ireland, and accepted
that the border was a legitimate international frontier.20 There
could be relations between states, and there would no longer be
an assertion of the essential unity of Ireland. If the Free State
had survived beyond the 1930s, it is undoubtedly the case that a
good-neighbourly policy on the part of Dublin would have been
reciprocated in Belfast's domestic and international politics.
That was not to be, however, because of Eamon de Valera
19. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
20. Ireland (Confirmation of Agreement) Act (1925) (Eng.); Treaty (Confirma-
tion of Amending Agreement) Act (1925) (Ir.).
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and the Fianna Fdiil civil-war losers, with their project of continu-
ing the national struggle. Some of de Valera's actions in office
in 1932 were unconstitutional, in terms of Irish law. In 1937, he
created a new successor state, Eire or Ireland ("Bunreacht na
hEireann," which has no English translation), enacted by plebi-
scite onJuly 1. The vote was 685,105 to 526,945, which de Valera
privately acknowledged was disappointing. 21
Articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht na hIireann, which legiti-
mized the state in terms of the nation in a legally confusing man-
ner,22 contained a territorial claim to Northern Ireland. This
was rebutted on December 29, 1937, by the U.K. Government,
along with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa,
exception being taken to Articles 2, 3, and 4.23 De Valera had
been advised against Hibernia Irredenta, 24 and the only court
that could have settled the territorial claim-the Permanent
Court of International Justice at The Hague-was studiously
avoided by successive Irish Governments, despite constitutional
commitment to the generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law. 25
The Belfast Agreement, in the short but crucial Constitu-
tional Issues section, emphasises the concept of consent. The
territorial claim, therefore, is no more. This is in spite of the still
confusing wording of the substitute Articles 2 and 3 for
21. DEIRDRE MCMAHON, REPUBLICANS AND IMPERIALISTS: ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS IN
THE 1930s, at 221 (1984). De Valera told the departing U.S. minister that "[t]he people
as a whole had not understood the importance of the fundamental measure." No
doubt de Valera included the people of Northern Ireland (Catholic and Protestant) in
this category, even though they were not citizens of his state (to the continuing relief of
Ulster unionists!).
22. Desmond Clarke, Nation, State and Nationality in the Irish Constitution, 16 IR. L.
TIMES 252 (1998).
23. TIMES (London), Dec. 30, 1937; Eire (Confirmation of Agreement) Act § 1
(1938).
24. See JOHN BowMAN, DE VALERA AND THE ULSTER QUESTION, 1917-1973, at 148
(1989) (quoting JJ. McElligott, Secretary, Department of Finance, 1927-53, in April
1937).
25. IR. CONST. art. 29.3 (1937). Article 29.2 affirmed adherence to the principle of
the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial
determination. Id. art. 29.2. In 1958, de Valera balked at taking a case to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, stating: "[Y]ou know the.way these tribunals are." Edna
Staunton, The Boundary Commission Debacle of 1925, HISTORY IRELAND, Summer 1996, at
45. It is interesting that Bertie Ahern, after the Belfast Agreement, has come out in
favor of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the world court. SUNDAY TIMES, Jan.
17. 1999.
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Bunreacht na htireann. The new text is largely an ideological
exercise, with, for example, the Irish diaspora being recognized
for the first time to no particular legal effect. The text does not
properly separate state and nation, and it does not adequately
address the question of nationality. Most in the Republic, but
only some in Northern Ireland, have an Irish identity, and there
is an alternative British identity. Dublin, however, has commit-
ted itself to not one, but two exercises of consent, first in North-
ern Ireland and then in the Republic. Even if the unionists were
to lose the first vote, Northern Ireland could not be absorbed
into the Republic until the people there, quite rightly, assented
to such a united Ireland. The best guarantee of the union, after
unionism, may well be the partitionism of southern people, who
have build a homogeneous state for themselves in the twentieth
century.
The Republic's continuing self-mystification (the legacy of
de Valera's long reign) encouraged "no" unionists to maintain
that the territorial claim still existed. In holding to this position,
they betrayed their own legal ignorance. The same occurred
over the question of U.K. constitutional changes, cosmetically
presented as reciprocity.
A great deal of ink was spilt over the repeal of the 1920
GOIA. Much legal nonsense circulated about section 75 being,
allegedly, the basis of U.K. sovereignty. That lies in the recogni-
tion by other states, about which there has never been any
doubt. Of course, the act is not being completely repealed, since
the definition of Northern Ireland in Section 1 will survive
through subsequent legislation. Moreover, Northern Ireland
has been defined further by the Northern Ireland Act 1998.26
Making U.K., like Irish, constitutional changes dependent on
the overall success of the Agreement was achieved during the
passage of the Northern Ireland Bill, while "no" unionists were
adopting an ineffective fundamentalist stance. Apparent conces-
sions-nationalist hokum about "birthright"-were made in the
complicated area of citizenship law, only to be qualified embar-
rassingly by the second annex to the British-Irish Agreement set-
ting out legal restrictions.
26. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 98 (Eng.).
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3. The Institutions of Government
a. Strand One
The Belfast Agreement, and the consequent Northern Ire-
land Act 1998, are principally about devolution. It is true that
Northern Ireland will have two innovations: north/south and
east/west dimensions of governance. But the main characteris-
tic of the structure, however, is its overcomplication, a problem
that will have to be cured under the review provisions of the
Agreement sooner rather than later.
The talks were organized in one to three strands,27 which
were written into the Agreement but not the act. The most im-
portant is Strand One, supposedly concerning Catholic-Protes-
tant, nationalist-unionist relations, but in reality dictating the na-
ture of Northern Ireland's integration within the United King-
dom.
Northern Ireland is to have an Assembly located in Parlia-
ment Buildings at Stormont. There was such a body for several
months in 1974, and again in 1982 and 1986 (but this was not a
legislative body). All powers not excepted or reserved in Sched-
ules 2 and 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are devolved.
Though the U.K. Government has tried to weaken the provision,
the Assembly will have an array of strong departmental, as well as
other committees. 2' Their chairpersons are to be elected under
the d'Hondt system used in the European Parliament, providing
for proportional representation of all parties above a certain
size.
Controversially, the executive-or executive committee-is
also appointed using the d'Hondt formula. 29 This, combined
with the fact that the executive has ajoint head, the first minister
and the deputy first minister, directly elected together by the As-
sembly, makes for a very strange administration in Northern Ire-
land. On July 1, 1998, David Trimble was elected first designate
minister, with Seamus Mallon as deputy first designate minister.
27. In addition, a "fourth" strand, Belfast-London relations, was detected in the
first strand.
28. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Operation of the Assembly 1 8-13; Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch.
47, §§ 13(3), 29.
29. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Executive Authority 16; Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 18.
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That relationship has been tested and, once we have moved
from the transition (where the Northern Ireland Office still
rules the roost) to full devolution, it will become clearer how
personality and powers interact. All governments need leaders.
More importantly, the automatic d'Hondt formula means that
with the 108 members of the Assembly, and the ten departments
of government agreed on December 18, 1998, ninety of those
members will be present, through their party representatives, in
the executive. This is executive-heavy government, and, with the
committees potentially liable to incorporation, it may mean the
Assembly will be a weak chamber of accountability. The more
likely alternative is that the executive, and therefore the govern-
ance of Northern Ireland, will be subject to deadlock and stale-
mate; neither the executive nor the legislature will work prop-
erly. Furthermore, the U.K. government's rule by department
strategy for dealing with this situation is a sort of civil-service
technocracy, and will not work underneath political shambles.
The UUP and SDLP agreed before Christmas 1998 that
there should be ten departments. Under d'Hondt, this means
that the ten departments will consisst of three UUP, three SDLP,
two DUP, and two Sinn F~in ministers, in addition to the first
minister and deputy first minister.3 0 Northern Ireland politi-
cians quickly spotted that this meant five unionists and five na-
tionalists, which reduces the majority/minority relationship to
equivalence.
There are two main responses to this criticism, which comes
exclusively from "no" unionists. First, d'Hondt favors bigger
over smaller parties, and this was known when the DUP advo-
cated the system. Though there were fifty-eight unionists to
forty-two nationalists at the time of the elections in June 1998,31
the nationalists were confined to two parties, twenty-four and
eighteen seats, respectively. Most unionists were members of two
parties, representing twenty-eight and twenty seats, but there was
a minority party of five, which subsequently split into one and
four, a party of two, and three independent unionists, who did
not constitute a party on July 1, 1998. Unionists votes were
30. This also included a number of junior ministers-a provision that surprisingly
appeared in the act, not having been in the Agreement.
31. See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 18(5) (providing definition of "S",
which only emerged from U.K. Government during passage of Northern Ireland Bill).
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wasted on these ten members.32 Second, it is more realistic to
look at the ten ministers in terms of centre/extreme. There is a
centrist majority of six to four, giving the UUP and SDLP the
incentive to coalesce on issue after issue in order to get a major-
ity and, therefore, a vote. This point is strengthened by the
thought that the DUP and Sinn Fain are unlikely to even consti-
tute a minority of four, though they could for transparently op-
portunist reasons. The biggest problems facing the ten ministers
in the executive committee, with its joint head in a central de-
partment, is DUP obstructionism and Sinn F6in subversion. It is
probable that one or both extreme-sectarian parties will leave
the involuntary d'Hondt coalition, the betting being that the
DUP will quit before Sinn Fain.
The best that can be hoped for is that the UUP and SDLP
will generate a spirit of voluntary coalitionism, and that this will
lead to a review of this aspect of the internal government of
Northern Ireland under Strand One and the final section of the
Belfast Agreement.
b. Strand Two
Strand Two-north/south cooperation-was seen during
the negotiations as a concession to nationalism. The UUP, draw-
ing on the experience of the old Stormont regime, did not turn
its face against practical proposals. It did, however, see off an
Irish Government offensive, in which there were forty-nine,
many unrealistic, ideas in the Mitchell draft paper of April 6.
These were cut back to the twelve in the Agreement, six areas for
continuing cooperation and six new joint, or implementation,
bodies." The text of the Agreement makes clear that the goals
were good neighbourliness and cooperation for mutual benefit.
It has nothing to do with an embryonic government of Ireland-
an attempt at incremental unity while there is no consent for
ceding Northern Ireland to the Republic-as claimed by some
nationalists and accepted by most "no" unionists. Nor can it be a
concession to Irish identity. Ulster unionists appreciate that a
consequence of practical cooperation may be greater commit-
32. If the UUP had obtained 38 seats (28 plus the 10 other unionists), then the
composition of a ten-minister executive would have been as follows: UUP - 4; SDLP - 2;
DUP - 2; and Sinn Fin - 2. This would have resulted in six unionist ministers to four
nationalist ministers.
33. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Two, Annex.
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ment by Catholics to the institutions of government. But to
pitch it in terms of identity only stirs up British reactions by the
DUP, obscuring crucial arguments about good government.
Unfortunately, the spirit of the Agreement was not much in
evidence during the final months of 1998, with the October 31
target slipping due in large part to the Irish Government. Dub-
lin hitherto had sought to pressure unionists by working through
London. This continued and the Northern Ireland Office
played ball. There was a smash and grab raid to try to recover
the position lost in the final week of the negotiations. Dublin
had also led a pan-nationalist consensus, servicing the SDLP and
especially Sinn Fain. This was also very much in evidence,
though I am pleased to see Sinn Ftin was allegedly "cut out of
the engagement ' 34 belatedly on December 18, when the UUP
and SDLP finally agreed on the Strand Two proposals.35 Never-
theless, the UUP, drawing largely on its own resources, and with
little institutional or personal memory of government before
1972, 36 had to negotiate with an alliance of the Irish Govern-
ment, the Northern Ireland Office, the SDLP, and Sinn Fain.
The UUP did not run away from Strand Two, and, as a re-
sult, there is no problem either of permanent loss of sovereignty
or of an incremental Dublin takeover of the institutions of gov-
ernment in Northern Ireland. The legal model guarantees this,
and the agreed policy areas will thus be seen as marginal.
c. Strand Three
Strand three-the east/west aspect of the Agreement-is in
fact, more important than the one just discussed. It involves two
institutions: the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (or
"Conference") and the British-Irish Council (or "Council").
Both involve two states, but in different ways.
The first institution, the Conference, is obviously a consola-
tion to the Irish Government. Since 1980, Dublin had a policy of
34. Gerry Adams, NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, OFFICIAL REPORT 427 (Jan.
18, 1999); see Mitchell McLaughin, NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, OFFICIAL REPORT
442 (Jan. 18, 1999) (stating that "Sinn Fein's view is that this was, in Nationalist terms, a
solo run by the SDLP").
35. See REPORT OF THE FIRST MINISTER DESIGNATE AND DEPUTY FIRST MINISTER DES-
IGNATE TO THE ASSEMBLY annexes 4-5 (Jan. 18, 1999) (no. NNIA 6).
36. The Rt. Hon.John Taylor MP is a notable exception to this lack of institutional
or personal memory.
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getting alongside London. This was partly related to aspirations
of joint sovereignty in Northern Ireland, but the U.K. govern-
ment responded with a bilateral intergovernmental council,
which met rarely in the 1980s. In 1985, to the surprise and then
disgust of unionists, London, in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, es-
tablished an intergovernmental conference dealing with North-
ern Ireland. Intended to lock Dublin into London's security
concerns, the Irish Government successfully used it to advance
pro-nationalist policies. Getting rid of the Anglo-Irish Confer-
ence became a priority for both "yes" and "no" unionists.
It was the "yes" unionists, by accepting the Belfast Agree-
ment, who achieved this objective. The "no" unionists, if they
had prevailed, would still be ineffectively opposing the Anglo-
Irish Agreement. The 1985 agreement had always envisaged
devolution leading to a loss of Dublin power in Northern Ire-
land, but it was the UUP that ensured a more limited brief. The
new conference is principally about bilateralism, and this was
borne out by Tony Blair's speech to the Oireachtas in Dublin on
November 26, 1998.
However, there is a strange reference to "the Irish Govern-
ment's special interest in Northern Ireland,"37 which must be in-
terpreted along with Dublin's undertaking to ratify the Council
of Europe's Framework Convention on National Minorities."
Dublin will continue to have a role in non-devolved Northern
Ireland matters. The consequences are not attractive: first, the
nationalist parties will seek to lobby London through the Irish
Government, rather than through the institutions of the United
Kingdom, including the Northern Ireland Assembly; and sec-
ond, this will weaken the new relationship created through the
North/South Ministerial Council, whereby Dublin is meant to
meet directly with northern unionists and nationalists from the
Assembly.
The hated Maryfield secretariat, whereby Irish civil servants
were permanently stationed in Belfast, being minded by North-
ern Ireland Office officials and under British army security, was
closed before Christmas. However, Dublin was able to use word-
37. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference 5.
38. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, Compara-
ble Steps by the Irish Government 9.
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ing in the Agreement about a standing joint secretariat 9 to per-
suade the Northern Ireland Office to let it stay in offices in cen-
tral Belfast, rather than have a bilateral secretariat in London or
Dublin. There is a need for an Irish Government presence in
Northern Ireland, not least because Belfast ministers and offi-
cials will need to negotiate with their opposite numbers without
always going to Dublin. But this properly should be done
through a consulate, similar to the one Dublin recently estab-
lished in Edinburgh and Cardiff. In answering "no" unionists'
cries about this secretariat, I will say: Maryfield would still exist if
you had prevailed, and what chance have you, with your heads in
the sand, of persuading the U.K. government to normalize rela-
tions with the Irish government?
The second institution, the Council, is actually listed first in
the Agreement. It is a totally new idea, and its provenance is
largely unionism-particularly fashioned by the late English,
catholic, tory MP, Sir John Biggs-Davison. It first saw life as the
Council of the British Isles, not in order to recreate the old
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, but rather out of
a recognition of the common interests of the peoples of two
states in these islands off the continental "mainland." The Brit-
ish-Irish Council was flagged for the first time in the January 12,
1998 Heads of Agreement, and it was from that point only that
there was a prospect of the UUP reaching an acceptable agree-
ment with the other parties.
The membership of the Council comprises two states, the
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland; three regional ad-
ministrations, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland; and the
Isle of Man and the Channels Islands. There is also a provision
for any devolved administrations within England. According to
the Agreement, a secretariat was to be provided by London and
Dublin in coordination with officials from each of the other
members.4" At the time of writing, the two states have appropri-
ated that responsibility. Hopefully, when the devolved adminis-
trations are in existence (there have not yet been elections in
Scotland or Wales), secretarial responsibilities will be shared.
The Council, given that it was formed at an early stage in the
39. Id., Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 8.
40. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental
Council 9.
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process of United Kingdom devolution, is an ideal vehicle for
countering centrifugal tendencies-the fear of a central govern-
ment in London long used to centralization. However, there are
worrying signs that some British officials, perhaps because of the
presence of the Irish state, would like to hold the United King-
dom together in more private and informal ways. This is un-
likely to be effective. The Council is a treaty body, and Ulster
unionists will insist that it embraces not just particular Northern
Ireland concerns, but the totality of relationships among the
peoples of these islands,4 including practical cooperation be-
tween administrations and states on the east/west dimension. It
is possible to argue that north/south cooperation (Strand Two)
is but an aspect of the permutation of cooperative relationships
possible under the Council.
4. From Terrorism to Democracy
The Belfast Agreement is inclusive not just because un-
reconstructed terrorists were brought into the process, contrary
to democratic norms.42 The Agreement is also inclusive in the
sense that just about every issue, real or imaginary, was ad-
dressed. Pages sixteen to twenty-five cover a wide variety of con-
cerns, including human rights, decommissioning, security, polic-
ing and justice, and prisoners.
Republicans talk about rights as if they were the only people
entitled to them, disregarding the fact that the IRA and loyalist
paramilitaries have infringed human rights to a vastly greater ex-
tent than the British state. This third aspect of the Agreement is
best seen as embracing the transition from terrorism to democ-
racy. It exemplifies how a legitimate government attempts to
construct a new polity without surrendering the moral high
ground by engaging in .appeasement. Demilitarization, so-
called, is good, but only when security is notjeopardized. These
sections, in the main, were not the work of the parties. London
agreed to them privately with Dublin, and they only first ap-
peared in the Mitchell draft paper of April 6, 1998. They almost
41. Id. 1 1.
42. The U.K. Government talked first about confidence building, meaning that
the paramilitaries had to convince democrats that they were changed characters. The
idea of confidence building was then appropriated by Sinn Fain; it is now about reassur-
ing them time and time again, before they made any gesture towards democratic prac-
tice.
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guaranteed no agreement. Needless to say, it is the aspect of the
Agreement of which the UUP is, and remains, most critical. In
the greater interests of a settlement, however, we were forced to
accept such things as prisoner releases most reluctantly. We did
so fully cognizant of the fact that, even if we had objected, the
Northern Ireland Office-desperate to maintain the so-called
IRA ceasefire-would have made concession after concession to
terrorism. The Belfast Agreement, with the UUP working in coa-
lition with the SDLP, has done something to mitigate state sur-
render. David Trimble has managed to keep the problem of
decommissioning, if not in relation to prisoner releases (which is
exclusively the responsibility of the secretary of state), then on
the question of the inclusion of Sinn Fin in the executive, on
the forefront since July 1, 1998.
Decommissioning by the Loyalist Volunteer Force began on
December 18, in the immediate wake of the UUP/SDLP agree-
ment on departments and north/south cooperation. We are
still waiting for the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster
Volunteer Force to follow suit. But, above all, we are still waiting
for the IRA, Sinn Fin after all being the only paramilitary party
eligible for inclusion in the Northern Ireland executive.
IV. DECOMMISSIONING
Sinn Fin argues, and not a few journalists have fallen for
the spin, that decommissioning is not a precondition for the for-
mation of the executive. I disagree profoundly; it is legally and
morally explicit in the Belfast Agreement. Without apparently
blushing, the republicans argued in late 1998 that the executive
was a precondition for the North/South Ministerial Council,
even though the text made clear that "the Northern Ireland
Transitional Administration,"43 which is the first minister desig-
nate and the deputy first minister designate, had to undertake
the work program with the Irish Government.
The starting point is April 10, 1998. On that day, the IRA
was an illegal organization in Northern Ireland and the Repub-
lic, holding illegal arsenals of weaponry. At no stage did the Brit-
ish or Irish Governments ever change the law, saying that the
43. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Two, North/South Ministerial Council
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IRA could hold on to weapons until some mythical start date.44
Indeed, the two states had, on August 26, 1997, signed a treaty
establishing the Independent International Commission on
Decommissioning.45 It did not make the holding of such arms
legal or make provision for that in certain circumstances. The
international agreement followed legislation in London and
Dublin earlier that year.46 It, in turn, was followed-in accord
with the Belfast Agreement4V-on June 29, 1998, by decommis-
sioning schemes enacted by London and Dublin.4" These
schemes allowed decommissioning and did not permit the hold-
ing of illegal weapons.
Tony Blair was alert to this point on the day of the Agree-
ment. His letter of April 10, 1998, which has been published a
number of times, contained as a last paragraph: "I confirm that
in our view the effect of the decommissioning section of the
Agreement, with decommissioning schemes coming into effect
in June, is that the process of decommissioning should begin
straight away." Straight away; not the end of June 1998. The
imperative of decommissioning stemmed from the illegality, not
from the express wording of the Agreement. The prime minis-
ter, however, stated that this was also the effect of the decommis-
sioning section of the Agreement on page twenty, and he wrote
this letter shortly before signing the British-Irish Agreement. In
international law, it is arguably part of the context of that treaty.
Has Bertie Ahern, the other signatory, disavowed it? It is cer-
tainly, in the case of ambiguity, part of the supplementary means
of interpretation of the Agreement.
I stated above that the obligations of the Belfast Agreement
fell mainly on the two states, but that, largely through legislation,
other office holders were legally bound. The two potential Sinn
44. That is the legal meaning of "decommissioning is not a precondition."
45. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland Establishing the Independent
Commission on Decommissioning, Aug. 26, 1997, Cm. 3753.
46. Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act, 1997, ch. 7 (Eng.); Decommis-
sioning Act (1997) (Ir.)..
47. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Decommissioning 6.
48. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME (June 29, 1998);
Decommissioning Act, 1997 (Sections 5 and 6) (Commencement) Order, 1998, SI No.
215 of 1998 (Ir.); Decommissioning Act, 1997 (Decommissioning) Regulations, 1998, SI
No. 216 of 1998 (Ir.).
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Fain ministers, though they have not been identified personally,
fall into this category.
This can be seen from the Belfast Agreement. The Decom-
missioning section of the Agreement does a number of things.
First, it refers back to a procedural motion in the negotiations of
September 24, 1997, where "the resolution of the decommission-
ing issue [was described as] an indispensable part of the process
of negotiation." It is implied that the issue has been settled. Sec-
ond, it acknowledges paragraph 25 of Strand One, where those
who threaten or use force are required to be excluded or re-
moved from ministerial office. Third, it foregrounds the
Decommissioning Commission as the means by which verifiable
decommissioning will take place. And fourth, it imposes a series
of obligations on all participants. In addition, these obligations
imply that paramilitary parties will first, reaffirm commitment to
the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations (not take
all guns out of Irish politics); second, to work constructively and
in good faith with the Commission (again implicitly an obliga-
tion on the paramilitary parties only); third, to "use any influ-
ence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all
paramilitary arms within two years," which is an obvious refer-
ence to the parliamentary parties. The last is the only obligation
that Sinn Fain acknowledges, but it is evident that there are at
least the other two just listed.
This paragraph also refers to two years "following endorse-
ment in referendums North and South of the Agreement."
There is, incontrovertibly, a timescale for decomissioning. Ob-
servers have talked about an end point, but there being no start-
ing point. This is wrong for two reasons. First, the starting point
is implied by general law as the day of the Agreement, and, as
seen, this was stated expressly by the prime minister in his letter
to David Trimble. Second, the Agreement refers to the May 22,
1998 referendums. There is evidence that this was in the minds
of the two governments subsequently: the British decommission-
ing scheme contains a note about the extension of the amnesty
period to May 22, 2000;4" and the Republic's regulations are due
to expire on May 22, 2000.50 There is an argument that decom-
49. Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act, 1997.
50. Decommissioning Act, 1997 (Decommissioning) Regulations, 1998, SI No. 216
of 1998, regulation 3.
1999] 1341
1342 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1320
missioning could only start on June 30, 1998, when the decom-
missioning schemes came into force. This is contradicted by
both the principle of legality and the point just made about May
22, 1998. Whatever start date is chosen-April 10, May 22, or
June 30-it is clear that there is a start date, and that this date
has been used to calculate when the two-year period comes to an
end. Since June 30, 1998, the day before David Trimble was
elected first minister designate, he has been able to argue con-
vincingly that the IRA should have started to decommission.
There is more-much more-in the Belfast Agreement.
The Declaration of Support refers to a "total and absolute com-
mitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means" and to
"opposition to any use or threat of force . . . for any political
purpose." Strand One, as noted, contains paragraph 25 on ex-
clusion or removal from office, with the pledge of office as an
annex. Paragraph 35 requires shadow ministers to affirm oppo-
sition to the threat or use of force. The human rights section
expressly states "the right to pursue democratically national and
political aspirations," there being of course no right in interna-
tional law to pursue such political goals by violent means. Simi-
larly, the section on victims refers to "a peaceful and just soci-
ety." The Decommissioning section is followed by one on Secur-
ity, which expressly recognizes the legitimacy of the British state
and associates the Irish Government with the problem of "any
continuing paramilitary activity." The section on prisoners also
refers to a two-year period of an association-certainly in the
Belfast Agreement-with decommissioning, from the end of
June 1998. To say that decommissioning is not a requirement
for Sinn Fain membership in the executive is to ignore much of
the letter, and all of the spirit, of the Agreement. Proper legal
interpretation shows that decommissioning and membership in
the executive are interrelated.
Finally, a political question. What is wrong with Sinn Fain
sitting in the executive, while the IRA, with which it is inextrica-
bly interlinked, remains fully armed? Many nationalists pretend
to see no problem, and trust to an "ah sure" mentality where the
problem will solve itself-in unspecified time.
The answer is quite simple. A minister is charged by the
Assembly, and before that by the people, with making decisions
in the public interest. It is a responsibility surrounded by public
law duties, and he or she, who is after all a politician, cannot be
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influenced by the threat or even the use of force. Sinn F~in,
even when it is pretending to be pure and innocent, can only
menace. For evidence, one has only to look at sections of the
Irish and U.K. Governments. David Trimble, and his senior
party colleagues, are prepared to share power with nationalists.
They are not prepared to sit in a room and to build the trust
necessary for good government, with people who have a past,
and, despite all the pressure that they have come under since
April 10, 1998, are not prepared to make a democratic gesture
by beginning the process of decommissioning.
It is not a case of surrender. It is a matter of the republicans
proving their bona fides. Their election alone does not accom-
plish that, and their erstwhile military campaign from 1970 re-
mains the stumbling block that they must overcome.
V. THE FUTURE
There can be doubt that the U.K. and Irish Governments do
not want another failed initiative. The consequences would be a
return to republican and loyalist violence. The IRA, as a result
of the building up of Sinn Fain by London and Dublin from
1988, would feel that it had a wider democratic basis for armed
struggle. The loyalists, believing that the two governments had
long sold out, would almost certainly escalate their campaigns of
violence.
There is no alternative to the Belfast Agreement, and the
"no" unionists, in much that they do and say, risk encouraging
the malignant scenario outlined above. However, there is a bat-
tle over the true meaning of the Agreement. The Irish Govern-
ment, while it affirmed the rule of law (particularly in the wake
of the Omagh carnage of August 15, 1998), is too uncritical of
the republicans; the Irish state, after all, was created by the post-
1917 Sinn Fain, which fought a civil war over its foundation.
Moral vision is obscured with folky nonsense about "the boys."
The U.K. government, weakened by decades of responsibility
and ignorant "anti-colonial" international criticism, has, in trying
to bring the republicans into the tent of politics, been tempted
too often by appeasement. Governments hold power in trust for
the people, and David Trimble views it his duty in Northern Ire-
land to be the first custodian of the institutions of democracy.
That is what he has been doing, and will continue to do. Hope-
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fully, it will be possible to have power transferred from London
to Belfast sooner rather than later, so that the people of North-
ern Ireland-unionist, nationalist, and other-can take respon-
sibility for determining their own future. Whether Sinn F6in is a
part of that project will be decided by the only organization with
the power to do so, the IRA. With Sinn Fin, the prospects for
Northern Ireland will be good. Without it, it should 'also be pos-
sible to create a new political community based on tolerance and
respect.
